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The Court's provisions for notice of the charges, opportunity to
call witnesses and to present real evidence, and a written record of the
evidence relied on and reasons for the action taken' 0 ' are crucial to
a fair hearing and their importance must not be ignored. The effectiveness of these procedures for insuring fairness, however, is diminished by the denial of confrontation and cross-examination.
First, although notice is required in part to "enable [the inmate]
to marshal the facts and prepare a defense,""', "[a]bsent confrontation and cross-examination, . . . the party proceeded against is without knowledge of the adverse evidence and cannot, therefore . . .
make his defense."' 1 5 Furthermore, without the chance to "challenge
the word of his accusers" 10 6 given by the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, it will be considerably more difficult for the prisoner to "'explain away the accusation' ,'07 since he cannot show
mistake by the other party. Finally, even the most impartial hearing
board cannot fairly judge credibility, nor accurately determine which
version of the disputed facts is true if one side in the contest is not
even questioned. 0 8
THOMAS WARREN

Ross

Labor Law-Organizational Rights of Managerial Employees
In 1970 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) abruptly departed from the position it had maintained throughout its history on the
status of managerial employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).' Traditionally, the Board had excluded from bargaining
units and from coverage by the Act, all employees whom it identified
as managerial, 2 even though these employees were never statutorily ex103.
104.
105.
106.

418 U.S. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564.
Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
418 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

107. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1086 (M.D. Fla. 1973), quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
108. 418 U.S. at 582.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
2. For a history of the status of managerial employees see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275-90 (1974).
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eluded by the NLRA.3 For purposes of this exclusion, the Board
labelled as "managerial" any employee who participated in the formulation, determination or effectuation of management policies. 4 In 1970,
however, the Board repudiated its former position and in effect
established a presumption that managerial employees were entitled to
bargaining rights under the NLRA unless it could be shown that they
were involved in shaping or implementing labor relations policies for
their employers.5 This new position was shortlived. In NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc.6 the United States Supreme
Court reinstated the Board's former rule, holding that all employees
properly classified as managerial are excluded from the protections of
the NLRA-not just those in positions susceptible to conflicts of interest in labor relations."
On June 16, 1971, the buyers in the purchasing and procurement
department of a plant operated by Bell Aerospace Company voted in
favor of union representation. Prior to the election the company had
objected to the designation of the buyers as an appropriate bargaining
unit on the grounds that they were managerial employees and thus excluded from the collective bargaining provisions of the Act. 8 The
3. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). The Board accomplished this statutory modification through the exercise of the discretionary power to determine appropriate bargaining
units which was vested in it by section 9(b) of the Act. Section 9(b) reads in part
as follows: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof. . .

"

29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).

Managerial employees were not the only class of employees to be denied collective
bargaining rights under this section. Confidential employees, defined in Ford Motor
Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) as "those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations," have also been refused the protection and privileges granted to other workers by
the NLRA. Both classes of employees were excluded from the Act to the same extent
as were the statutorily excluded employees--"all are outside the Act for purposes of the
employee rights accorded by section 7 (including bargaining unit representation) and
denied protection from what otherwise would be unfair labor practices under section 8,
despite the lack of reference to either classification in the language of the NLRA." 26
VANe. L. REV. 850, 853-54 (1973).
4. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
5. See North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
6. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
7. A second issue resolved in Bell Aerospace, which will not be discussed in this
note, was whether, in order to decide if a certain class of employees, in this case buyers,
were properly classified as managerial, the Board was obligated to employ its section
6 rulemaking powers or whether it could make this determination in an adjudicatory proceeding. The Court held that not only is resolution of this type of problem in an adjudicatory proceeding permitted, but that adjudication is a particularly appropriate
method of making that determination. Id. at 294.
8. Id. at 269. The company argued alternatively that, since the buyers could ne-
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Board, however, held that only those managerial employees who are
involved in formulating and effectuating their employer's labor policies
are excluded from the Act and certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the buyers.9 The company refused to bargain
after the election and the Board, upon finding that the company had
violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act, issued an order requiring the company to bargain.' 0 The Second Circuit denied enforce-

ment of the order" and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on
appeal by the Board. A sharply divided Supreme Court held that all

managerial employees must be excluded from the coverage of the Act
and that the Board was not free to restrict that traditional exclusion to

only those employees whose union activity might present a conflict of
12
interest in labor relations.
To reach this decision without any explicit statutory basis, the
majority relied first upon the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 13 To the Court, this history indicated that Congress had intended

to exclude managerial employees from the NLRA even though no express provision to that effect was included in the Taft-Hartley Act.

Congress apparently believed that explicit exclusion was unnecessary
since the Board's policy at that time was to exclude such employees and
there was no reason to expect this policy to change in the future.' 4 The
gotiate prices, select vendors, and commit the company's credit up to $5000, representation should be denied because of the potential for conflict of interest. The Board rejected this claim, noting that the buyers' discretion was limited by guidelines established
by the employer and thus any temptation to use their position to assist the union movement could be effectively curtailed. Id. at 271.
9. See Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971), reaff'd, 196 N.L.R.B. 827
(1972).
10. 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972).
11. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. 416 U.S. at 289.
13. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
14. To substantiate this position the Court pointed to the Conference Committee
Report that specifically stated that provisions of a House bill calling for explicit exclusion from the Act of employees working in labor relations, employment and personnel
departments had been deleted from the final version of the bill because Congress believed that the Board would continue its de facto exclusion of these employees without
specific legislation. Id. at 282. The majority also pointed to excerpts from the legislative history of the Act that indicated congressional concern that bargaining rights should
not be extended to corporate executives.
In discussing the status of confidential employees, the House noted that "[m]ost
of the people who would qualify as 'confidential employees' are executives and are excluded from the Act in any event." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1947). Finally, the majority relied on language in the Senate Report and on comments
made during congressional debates that indicated congressional concern that, if supervisory employees were granted bargaining rights under the Act, the same reasoning could
be used to extend these rights to "corporate vice-presidents and other executives who
were part of management." 416 U.S. at 284 n.13.
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Court also noted that, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress was
concerned with the welfare of the common worker and not with those
representing the employer's interests. Accordingly, Congress sought
to maintain a distinct division between management and labor to assure
that employers would have loyal representatives within the company
and that "bosses" would not be allowed in positions that would enable
them to dominate or cause them to be dominated by the rank-and-file
workers."5 From rather sketchy passages in the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act the majority reasoned that, since Congress may
have intended to exclude certain managerial employees, all other employees traditionally classified as managerial should likewise be considered as outside of the Act even though they were never mentioned
in the congressional debates or reports. The majority also relied
heavily upon congressional failure to enact legislation either in 194710
or 19591" explicitly including managerial employees within the scope
of the Act in light of the Board's prior holdings that they were
18
excluded.
The dissent, on the other hand, agreed with the Board's new position that only those managerial employees who shape and implement
the employer's labor policies should be denied the right to organize under the NLRA. They argued that only the organization of this narrower group of workers would upset the delicate balance of power in
the collective bargaining process that Congress had intended to main19
tain.
Although the Supreme Court majority in Bell Aerospace presented a feasible argument that Congress in 1947 contemplated the ex15. 416 U.S. at 281-82.
16. The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947).
17. The NLRA was further amended in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
18. After reviewing the Board's decisions in this area, the Court concluded that,
although prior to 1947 the Board had never stated that managerial employees could not
be accorded bargaining rights under the Act, it had nonetheless never permitted them
to be included in bargaining units of rank-and-file workers and had never certified a bargaining unit comprised exclusively of managerial employees. 416 U.S. at 276. The
Court also noted that after 1947 the Board did expressly adopt the position that managerial employees were beyond the scope of the Act and consistently maintained this position until 1970. Id. at 289. The majority then argued that congressional failure to
modify the Board's holding or to change the Board's definition of "managerial employee"
was persuasive evidence that that agency's interpretation of the statute was the one intended by Congress. id. at 275.
19. Id. at 308. The dissent based its decision on the lack of any specific language
in either the statute or the legislative history of the Act addressed to the status of managerial employees. Id. at 297.
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clusion of managerial employees as well as supervisory employees from
the Act, the dissent presented an equally persuasive argument that
Congress did not intend such a broad exclusion. Confronted with such
ambiguity, perhaps a better approach to the issue would have been to
examine it in light of the policies that underlie the NLRA and the economic realities of current industrial organization.
The congressional concerns outlined in the majority's decision
were based on industrial organization as it existed in 1947. Employment patterns, however, have changed drastically since that time with
a larger percentage of workers now entering the lower levels of management. 20 As the number of these managerial employees has increased, so may have the bureaucratization and concomitant disaffection with higher management that usually accompanies such an increase. As a result, the traditional alignment with the employer that
the Board had in the past attributed to managerial employees2 1 may
have been severed. If these employees have lost or subsequently lose
their attachments to their employers and find that their demands are
not being satisfied, they may, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Bell
Aerospace, organize and bargain outside of the Act. Their constitutional right to do so has been established. 2 The result might be the
type of economic warfare that the Act was designed to avoid. 3
20. Statistics presented in the United States Bureau of the Census Reports show
for example that, while only 0.09% of the labor force were classified as personnel and
labor relations workers in 1950, 0.15% were so classified in 1960 and 0.38% in 1970.
Likewise, in 1950 only 0.059% of the labor force were classified as credit personnel

whereas the 1960 figure was 0.070% and the 1970 figure was 0.080%.

This trend is

also reflected in the percentages of workers employed as purchasing agents and buyers

(other than retail buyers): 0.11% in 1950; 0.15% in 1960; and 0.21% in 1970. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, SUBJECT REPORTS,
OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Final Rep. 1973); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
OF POPULATION: 1960, SUBJECT REPORTS, OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS,
table 1, at 2-3 (Final Rep. 1963); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATIoN: 1950, EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONAL CHARACTERIsTiCs, table 1, at 1B 15-16,
CENSUS

(Spec. Reports, pt. 1, ch. A, 1953).
21.

Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sunnyland

Packing Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 162 (1955); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
22. See Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
570 (1930); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). Although the collective bargaining provisions and unfair labor practice protections of the

Act lend enormous strength to a union movement, they are not always essential.
23. Section 1 of the Act expresses its policy:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the

intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce.

...

Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
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Neither the Board nor the Court could then regulate this activity since
the regulatory mechanisms of the Act are not applicable to employees
not covered by it. The result could be detrimental to the interests of
both employers and employees.
The Supreme Court's decision to exclude all managerial employees from the collective bargaining process provided by the Act also ignores the fact that, although these employees may be more closely
aligned to management than to rank-and-file workers with respect to
their job responsibilities, they share with all other employees the desire
for job security, periodic wage increases, and other economic benefits
that the employer might not provide absent organized economic pressure. Although in the past managerial employees could probably expect to achieve such benefits by performing their jobs well, a substantial
increase in the number of managerial employees might have reduced
the possibility that outstanding work will be noticed and rewarded.
While there are legitimate policies favoring unions of managerial
employees, there are also legitimate objections. The Board has long
recognized that the most serious of these objections is the potential conflict of interest 24 that might destroy the delicate balance of power between labor and management that the Act seeks to assure. Examples
of the potential dangers to employers claimed to be inherent in such
a split of allegiance include the possibilities: (1) that managerial employees who are unionized might show favoritism to union-organized
companies when accepting bids or making purchases; (2) that the employees will guard the interests of their sister unions in the company
when making recommendations of management policies or when
executing these policies; and (3) that managerial employees may further disrupt the conduct of their employer's business by engaging in
sympathy strikes or other economic measures to assist sister unions in
their bargaining struggle with the employer in exchange for similar asto organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest ....
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
24. The conflict is between the employee as a union member and the employee as
a representative of management.
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sistance when the managerial employees bargain.

Such concerns, however, are perhaps unfounded since the employer has the capacity to control possible inclinations toward favoritism

by discharging employees if their unprotected activities cause injury to
the business and by establishing strict guidelines to which these employ-

ees must conform when making managerial decisions. However, the
employer may argue in response that after-the-fact discharge does not
remedy a fait accompli breach of trust and that in certain instances,

broad discretion is precisely what is required of an employee's position.
Thus forcing the employee to adhere to strict guidelines would partially

destroy his usefulness to the employer.
As a result of Bell Aerospace the types of employees to whom
the Act's protections will not be available will be determined by the
criteria established by the Board for defining managerial employees
prior to 1970. Corporate officers and employees who work in labor
relations 25 have always been held to be managerial as have employees
who have actual responsibility for hiring or firing or who may effectively
recommend such action.20 Other employees have been found to be
managerial if the evidence showed that they participated in making or
implementing the employer's management policies 27 or had "discretion,

independent of the employer's established policy, in the performance
of [their] duties.

28

Using this formula, the Board has fairly consist-

ently labelled the following positions managerial: buyers,2 9 credit de25. See American Broadcasting Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79 (1953) (employee whose
responsibilities included formulating the employer's interpretation of collective bargaining contract clauses held managerial).
26. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 414, 422 (1949).
27. To be classified as an employee who formulates or implements the employer's
management policies, the employee must be in a position to make decisions that will
definitely influence that policy. The fact that he may recommend policy decisions does
not alone establish his managerial status. Nor does "mere participation in conferences
of supervisory personnel, from which emerge some decisions, based in part upon his recommendations . . . ." Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1272 (1952). See
Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 391, 392-93 (1958); Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 1825, 1827 (1957). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337,
340 (1955).
28. Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969);
Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963). "TIThe Board does not consider the performance of duties requiring the exercise of judgment to be an indication
of managerial status per se, nor do the lack of close supervision and freedom to exercise
considerable discretion render an employee managerial where his decisions must conform
to the employer's established policy." Albert Lea Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 119
N.L.R.B. 817, 822-23 (1957); see American Broadcasting C., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79
(1953); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 549, 554-55 (1948).
29. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956); see Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103

816
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partment personnel, 30 expediters,"' and employees who establish the
company's price lists.3 2

Had the Board's new test been affirmed by the court, labor relations personnel would of course have been excluded.

The dissent also

suggested that, if corporate officers were not reached because of their
responsibilities for labor relations, they could probably be excluded as
supervisory. 3 In addition, although neither the Board nor the dissent
in Bell Aerospace defined the scope of the category "employees who

shape or implement the employer's labor relations policies," it is likely
that such a category would include upper-level employees in the employment and personnel departments. Thus the principal categories of
employees who would be excluded from the Act under the majority's
test but included under the Board's test are buyers, some credit department personnel, expediters, and employees who set prices for goods

manufactured by the company.
Having established whose right to organize under the Act is
actually at issue, one may then determine whether the Supreme Court
or the Labor Board adopted the better position. To make this determination it is necessary to balance the employer's right to have loyal
employees to assist him in making and executing his management
policies against the strong public policy of promoting peaceful settlements of labor disputes and the employees' interest in achieving a bargaining position sufficient to insure their effective participation in their
economic future. Would permitting these employees to organize in
N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953); Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246
(1946); Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1946); Hudson
Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944). The Board has also excluded as managerial a buyer who, though limited to placing orders with an approved list of vendors,
could use his discretion as to which vendor would receive the order. Titeflex, Inc., 103
N.L.R.B. 223, 225-26 (1953).
30. Charles Livingston & Sons, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 30, 33-34 (1949). Contra,
Franklin's Stores Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 793, 794-95 (1957). If the amount of credit and
the standards for extending credit are so limited as to make the determinations routine,
the employee will not be held to be managerial. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 100 N.L.R.B.
90, 91 (1952).
31. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944). But see Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 907 (1946).
32. Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1245 (1946) . The Board
has refused to recognized similar positions as managerial. American Fed. of Labor, 120
N.L.R.B. 969 (1958) (employees with remote connection with top management); Titeflex, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 223, 224 (1953) (sales representatives); Transit Cas. Co., 83
N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1949) (insurance adjusters); Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 75
N.L.R.B. 1132, 1126 (1948) (sales representatives).
33. 416 U.S. at 307 n.3.
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bargaining units separate from those of the rank-and-file workers 34 so

hinder the employer in operating his business and place him at such
disadvantage at the bargaining table that the employees should be de-

nied the right to organize by judicial decree even though the NLRA
has never explicitly denied them that right? The answer to this question is at best a matter of opinion. However, it was precisely for decid-

ing this type of question that Congress established a special agency that,
through its constant contact with industry and the problems of interpreting the labor statutes, could develop the expertise needed to resolve
these issues. 35 Nevertheless, the Board's response has been rejected
and the responsibility for providing these employees the protection of
the NLRA lies now with Congress.
SHIRLEY J.WELLS

Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After
Jackson
For nearly a century those who would impose constitutional limita-

tions on ostensibly private conduct have been grappling with the elusive
concept of "state action."' Indeed, the problem of defining state action in the troublesome no man's land between purely private and

purely governmental conduct has been called the most important problem in American law.2 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.3 -the
United States Supreme Court found the essential state -action requirement lacking in a customer's attempt to impose due process limitations

on the termination procedure of a privately owned utility company.4
34. Separate units for guards and professional employees have been authorized
since 1947. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
35. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
1. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) the United States Supreme
Court first propounded the essential dichotomy between state action, which is subject
to constitutional restraints, and "individual invasion of individual rights," which is not.
The distinction for fourteenth amendment purposes is based on the proscription that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law. . . ." U.S. CoNST.amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,and California'sProposition 14, 81 HAIv. L. REv. 69 (1967).
3. 95 S.Ct. 449 (1974).
4. Lower courts had been sharply divided in applying the state action doctrine to
utilities which were privately owned, but subject to extensive and detailed regulation by
the state. Compare Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke

